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FAULT: A VIABLE MEANS OF RE-INJECTING RESPONSIBILITY IN MARITAL RELATIONS*
It would be difficult for the most fecund mind to conceive a
more sordid story of revolting details than that which is
portrayed in the testimony in this case. To recite it would be
to give permanent form to a chapter which, for all time,
would inflict anguish and shame upon innocent persons.
There could be no justification for the recital here of things
which would shock every sense of delicacy and refinement.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The era of marital fault being the only grounds for divorce in
the United States has passed, and its passing brings few tears
to the eyes of most. As evidenced by the passage above, the
airing of marital fault in open court, even in the days when
such practices were the norm, at times shocked the sensibilities
and conscience of those who had to listen to the evidence and
then issue decisions based upon it.
This article is not an indiscriminate appeal for the return of
fault in the dissolution of marriage. Nor does this article urge a
return to a system where years of accumulated misery and
acrimony must be dredged up in order to obtain every divorce,
regardless of the fact that both parties may wish to simply end
their union and no fault in fact exists.
Marriage has become somewhat of a revolving door in this
country today. It is expected that up to ffty percent of currently existing marriages in the United States will end in divorce.2
* This article was the second place winner of the 1995 McNeill Writing
Competition.
1. Holt v. Holt, 5 S.E.2d 504, 505 (Va. 1939) (describing the allegations in a
divorce case brought under fault grounds).
2. Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable DistributionLaw on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 621, 625 (1991) (citing Samuel H. Preston, Estimating the Proportion of American Marriages that End in
Divorce, 3 SOC. METHODS & REs. 435, 457 (1975)); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform
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No-fault divorce cannot be entirely blamed for this fact, since as
early as 1967 the United States had the "highest rate of divorce
of any nation of parallel culture and development in the
world."3 However, it has been argued that the availability of
pure no-fault divorce has resulted in more frequent initiation of
divorce by husbands, less frequent alimony awards, reduced
child support amounts, reduced awards of family assets to the
wife, and increased responsibility of wives for household debts
upon divorce.' It has also been observed that the advent of nofault divorce signalled an end to the notion of marriage as a
status having at its core the concept of a contract with God and
spouse, the breaking of which necessitated circumstances which
were intolerable and unavoidable-fault.5 Thus there are competing notions concerning the enactment of no-fault divorce. On
the one hand, some feel that legislation providing for no-fault
divorce has simply made a legal reality of what was already
occurring in society. Conversely, others feel that no-fault divorce
has exacerbated a grave social problem and resulted in granting
persons an easy way out of marriage and thereby cheapening
the institution-easy come, easy go.
This article sets out a principled basis for re-injecting some
elements of fault into the process of marital dissolution. In Part
II, the traditional fault grounds of divorce are discussed. Part
III analyzes the abandonment of fault in the era of no-fault
divorce and looks at the economic consequences to divorcing
spouses. This section also examines two empirical studies which
demonstrate that no-fault divorce has done nothing to change
the negative and disproportionate economic impact upon
women's fortunes at divorce, and asserts that marital property
is, in most cases, inadequate to serve as a means of rectifying
the financial inequities among divorcing spouses. Part IV builds
upon this theme by advancing and analyzing a theory of alimo-

and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (1989) (citing Charles E. Welch &
Sharon Price-Bonham, A Decade of No-Fault Revisited: California, Georgia, and
Washington, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 411, 411 (1983)).
3. Charles W. Tenney, Jr., Divorce Without Fault: The Next Step, 46 NEB. L.
REV. 24, 34 (1967).
4. Harvey L. Golden & J. Michael Taylor, Fault Enforces Accountability, FAM.
ADvoc., Fall 1987, at 11, 13. "Alimony" is used interchangeably with "spousal support" throughout this article, as both terms are used in the various sources cited.
5. Id. at 11.
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ny which might accomplish the goal of rectifying some of the
financial inequities of divorce and removing incentives for marriage-destroying behavior. Finally, in Part V, a case is made for
a system of alimony which considers marital fault upon divorce
and which can be used to encourage the sort of responsible
marital behavior which society considers desirable.
II. OVERVIEW OF FAULT GROUNDS
Our legal system, based upon English common law, looked to
the English ecclesiastical courts for precedents in the area of
domestic relations.6 Initially, because there were no ecclesiastical courts in the new nation, no real mechanism for obtaining a
divorce existed. Therefore, many of the divorces prior to the
middle of the nineteenth century were granted through special
legislative acts in state legislatures.8 When this began to be
seen as an unsatisfactory method of obtaining divorce, the various state legislatures conferred general divorce jurisdiction on
the state courts. 9 The new state statutes usually required proof
of a statutorily enumerated fault or offense against the marriage before a divorce would be granted, and then a divorce was
granted only upon the application of the spouse who was not at
fault. 10
The most common fault ground was adultery, most likely
directly borrowed from the ecclesiastical courts which had al-

6. E.g., Du Pont v. Du Pont, 83 A.2d 105, 108 (Del. Super. Ct. 1951), affd, 90
A.2d 467 (Del. 1952) (quoting S. v. S., 29 A-2d 325, 326 (Del. Super. Ct. 1942)
("Though the Ecclesiastical Law of England is no part of our Common Law, yet when
that part of the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts relating to the annulment of
marriage and divorce was given by law to our Courts, it is reasonable to believe that
we should follow the principles and precedents of the Ecclesiastical Courts in the
administration of our law. .. .")); Gold v. Gold, 62 A.2d 540, 542 (Md. 1948) ("In
divorce proceedings the court sits, not in the exercise of its ordinary equity jurisdiction, but as a divorce court and is governed by the rules and principles established in
the ecclesiastical courts in England so far as they are consistent with the provisions
of the Maryland Code.").
7. Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32,
35-36 (1966).
8. Id. at 36.
9. Id.
10. Id.; Norman B. Lichtenstein, Marital Misconduct and the Allocation of Financial Resources at Divorce: A Farewell to Fault, 54 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REv. 1, 2-3
(1985).
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lowed a divorce from bed and board on this ground." In fact,
the sole ground for divorce in New York until 1967 was adultery. 2 Originally, the fault grounds for divorce in most states

were narrow and few, and in addition to adultery included
cruelty and desertion. 3 Soon other grounds were legislated in
11. Wadlington, supra note 7, at 36.
12. Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 852 (N.Y. 1977) ("With the enactment
of the Divorce Reform Law of 1966 (L.1966, ch. 254), New York abandoned its position as the only State in the union which regarded adultery as the sole ground for
absolute divorce."); Tenney, supra note 3, at 32. The current section 170 of the New
York statute lists the grounds upon which New York courts will grant divorces:
An action for divorce may be maintained by a husband or wife to
procure a judgment divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage on
any of the following grounds:
(1) The cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant such that the conduct of the defendant so endangers the physical or
mental well being of the plaintiff as renders it unsafe or improper for
the plaintiff to cohabit with the defendant.
(2) The abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant for a period
of one or more years.
(3) The confinement of the defendant in prison for a period of
three or more consecutive years after the marriage of plaintiff and defendant.
(4) The commission of an act of adultery, provided that adultery
for the purposes of articles ten, eleven, and eleven-A of this chapter, is
hereby defined as the commission of an act of sexual or deviate sexual
intercourse, voluntarily performed by the defendant, with a person other
than the plaintiff after the marriage of plaintiff and defendant....
(5) The husband and wife have lived apart pursuant to a decree or
judgment of separation for a period of one or more years after the granting of such decree or judgment, and satisfactory proof has been submitted by the plaintiff that he or she has substantially performed all the
terms and conditions of such decree or judgment.
(6) The husband and wife have lived separate and apart pursuant
to a written agreement of separation, subscribed by the parties thereto
and acknowledged or proved in the form required to entitle a deed to be
recorded, for a period of one or more years after the execution of such
agreement and satisfactory proof has been submitted by the plaintiff that
he or she has substantially performed all the terms and conditions of
such agreement ....

In lieu of filing such agreement, either party to

such agreement may file a memorandum of such agreement, which memorandum shall be similarly subscribed and acknowledged or proved as
was the agreement of separation and shall contain the following information: (a) the names and addresses of each of the parties, (b) the date of
marriage of the parties, (c) the date of the agreement of separation and
(d) the date of this subscription and acknowledgement or proof of such
agreement of separation.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol. 1995).
13. JOHN D.W. GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW § 7.01(B) (1993);

Wadlington, supra note 7, at 36-37.
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the various states, including conviction of certain crimes, insanity, drug addiction, and numerous others with little consistency
across the nation.14 Divorce was originally discouraged, and
there was a strong public policy in favor of marriage and
against its dissolution. In 1888, according to the Supreme

Court:
[W]hilst marriage is often termed by text writers and in
decisions of courts a civil contract-generally to indicate
that it must be founded upon the agreement of the parties,
and does not require any religious ceremony for its solemnization-it is something more than a mere contract. The
consent of the parties is of course essential to its existence,
but when the contract to marry is executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is created which they
cannot change. Other contracts may be modified, restricted,
or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the
parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once formed, the
law steps in and holds the parties to various obligations
and liabilities. It is an institution the maintenance of which
in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress.15

The plaintiff spouse had to prove that the other spouse had in
fact committed one of the enumerated fault grounds in order to
receive a divorce decree, and a divorce case could be dismissed
for insufficient evidence. 6
Adultery, defined as sexual intercourse by either spouse with
someone not his or her spouse, is currently a fault ground for
divorce in approximately twenty-eight states.' Adultery may

14. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 13, § 7.01(B).
15. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888).
16. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 13, § 7.01(B).
17. Id. § 7.03(B)(2); see, e.g., Milne v. Milne, 587 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Ark. Ct. App.
1979) (holding, in a case where the appellant was accused of adultery which occurred
after he and his wife had separated, that adultery includes sexual intercourse by a
married person with a person not his or her spouse, regardless of whether the person
accused is living with his spouse at the time); Flood v. Flood, 330 A.2d 715, 717 n.1
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (holding that adultery is voluntary intercourse between a
married person and a partner other than the lawful spouse); W. v. W., 226 A.2d 860,
862 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (holding that for there to be adultery there must
be intercourse, and even actual proof of sexual conduct with a third person other
than intercourse would not constitute adultery).
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often be proved by circumstantial evidence, but the burden of
proof varies from a preponderance of the evidence in some
states to beyond a reasonable doubt in others."5
Cruelty is most often defined as bodily harm or reasonable
apprehension of bodily harm that endangers life, limb, or
health, and renders continued marital cohabitation unsafe or
improper; it is currently a ground for divorce in about twentysix states.' 9 Most courts recognize mental cruelty as falling
within this definition, and acts as diverse as a spouse's insistence on excessive or unnatural sexual intercourse, mistreatment and abuse of children, verbal and physical abuse, drunkenness, non-support, and homosexuality have been sufficient to
establish cruelty.2"

18. E.g., Frazier v. Frazier, 134 So. 2d 205, 207 (Ala. 1961) ("The charge of adultery may be proved by circumstantial evidence, but the circumstances must be such
as would lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to conclude that
the act of adultery has been committed."); Drees v. Drees, 490 P.2d 851, 852 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1971) (stating that cruelty, adultery, desertion, and noncohabitation are to
be proved by a preponderance of the evidence); McAdory v. McAdory, 608 So. 2d 695,
699 (Miss. 1992) ("In order to grant a divorce on the grounds of adultery, adultery
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence."); Cofone v. Cofone, 276 A.2d 184,
186 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) ("[T]he charge of adultery, if true, is known as a
crime, and its prosecution partakes strongly of the nature of a criminal proceeding, so
much so that the complaining spouse must prove the charge 'beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
19. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 13, § 7.03(B)(3); see, e.g., Steen v. Steen, 641 So.
2d 1167, 1170 (Miss. 1994) ("[H]abitual cruel and inhuman treatment [is] established
only by a continuing course of conduct on the part of the offending spouse which [is]
so unkind, unfeeling or brutal as to endanger, or put one in reasonable apprehension
of danger to life, limb or health, and further, such course of conduct must be habitual, that is, done so often, or continued so long that it may reasonably be said a permanent condition."); Kelly v. Kelly, 191 A. 287, 287 (N.J. Ch. 1936) (stating that
cruelty is established when it has been shown that if the husband "is allowed to
retain his power over the petitioner, and she is compelled to remain subject to him,
her life or her health will be endangered, or that he will render her life one of such
extreme discomfort and wretchedness as to incapacitate her to discharge the duties of
a wife").
20. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 13, § 7.03(B)(3); see, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 81

N.E.2d 820, 820-21 (Mass. 1948) (holding that where a wife engages in lewd and
lascivious conduct with her father in her husband's presence, such acts constitute
cruel and abusive treatment sufficient to sustain a divorce decree); Adams v. Adams,
198 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1972) (holding that extreme cruelty as defined by the
statute comprehends either grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering inflicted by one spouse upon the other); Defonis v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 43 S.E.2d 852,
854 (Va. 1947) (holding that cruelty toward a spouse may constitute desertion and
stating "[w]hen either spouse voluntarily so behaves that the other can no longer
remain with safety in the marriage state, and is forced to go elsewhere for protection,
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Desertion, defined as the breaking off of marital cohabitation
"with the intent to remain apart permanently, without the
consent and against the will of the other spouse, " is a traditional fault ground still recognized in about twenty-eight
states.22 A separation by mutual consent does not constitute
desertion by either party.23 Actions short of leaving the residence, such as withdrawing sexual privileges from the other
spouse without just cause, may constitute constructive desertion
which the court will enforce.24
Additional fault grounds for divorce are numerous and varied
across the states. It would not be useful or helpful to discuss
all of them in this article. The above grounds are intended to
give a brief framework of those grounds for divorce which are
still viable in most jurisdictions.
Just as there are numerous fault grounds for divorce, a
plethora of defenses may be invoked to defeat them. The various defenses are based on the idea that only an innocent
spouse could bring an action for dissolution of marriage under
the fault-based framework.' Most of the defenses to faultbased divorce have diminished in relevance, and none have any
relevance to no-fault divorce actions, but some continue to have
application in states where fault grounds form an alternate
basis for divorce.26
Recrimination is a defense where each party must establish
that the other has committed an act which would constitute a
fault under the statute, in which case neither would be permitted to get a divorce; in other words, neither party can receive equity under the "clean hands" rule. 7 Other defenses
the culpable spouse is guilty of desertion. And it matters not whether the injured
party is left in the home or is forced to leave by the behavior.").
21. E.g., Barnes v. Barnes, 428 S.E.2d 294, 297 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (citing
Arrington v. Arrington, 82 S.E.2d 548, 551 (Va. 1954) and Butler v. Butler, 133 S.E.
756, 758 (Va. 1926)).
22. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 13, § 7.03(B)(4).
23. E.g., Paraskewich v. Paraskewich, 223 A.2d 530, 530 (Del. 1966). Some jurisdictions require desertion to be proved and corroborated by independent evidence.
E.g., Hurt v. Hurt, 433 S.E.2d 493, 498 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
24. Reppert v. Reppert, 13 A.2d 705 (Del. Super. Ct. 1940); 27A C.J.S. Divorce §
44 (1986 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
25. Lichtenstein, supra note 10, at 3; Wadlington, supra note 7, at 38.
26. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 13, § 7.03(C).
27. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 13, § 7.03(C)(4); Wadlington, supra note 7, at 38-
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include: connivance, where one spouse procures or consents to
the other's commission of marital fault; collusion, where the
spouses commit fraud on the court by alleging false evidence of
a marital offense; and condonation, where the offended spouse
conditionally forgives the marital fault, so that the condonation
is nullified if the fault is repeated. 5
Fault grounds for divorce and defenses remain important for
a variety of reasons. No-fault grounds have not replaced fault
grounds in most states; instead they were merely added as
additional grounds for divorce. 29 Fault is still a factor in
awarding spousal support or dividing marital assets in many
states. ° In addition, this article and some other commentators
argue that fault still serves a worthwhile role in some aspects
of marital dissolution. 1
III. THE ABANDONMENT OF FAULT
A. The Move to No-Fault
In the 1960s it became apparent that attitudes toward divorce had changed dramatically, and that the courts were not
equipped to adequately handle the widespread social acceptance
of divorce as necessary and desirable. 32 One obvious and apparent symptom of the unpreparedness of the courts was seen
in the behavior of many couples who sought divorces in New
York. 33 These divorce-seeking couples would engage in sometimes outrageous conduct while cooperating in order to create

39.
28. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 13, § 7.03(C); Wadlington, supra note 7, at 39.
29. Thirty states currently retain fault grounds while also affording no-fault alternatives. Linda D. Elrod & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States, 27
FAM. L.Q. 515, 661 (1994).
30. For example, in Virginia adultery will preclude the guilty spouse from receiving spousal support. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1995).
31. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 13, § 7.03 (A).
32. Wadlington, supra note 7, at 32. Some factors which may have contributed to
the increased demand for divorce were the loosening of moral attitudes in the 1960s
and 1970s, women's changing roles and expectations, and a greater emphasis on selfgratification. Lichtenstein, supra note 10, at 4.
33. New York, as discussed earlier, only allowed divorce upon a showing of adultery. See Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 852 (N.Y. 1977); Tenney, supra note
3, at 32.
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the appearance of adultery either through perjured testimony or
mock or actual adultery to satisfy the statutory requirements.3 4 One of the major goals behind no-fault reform of divorce laws was to terminate this sort of activity. 5
In addition to preventing such activity from contaminating
the judicial process, other rationales for doing away with fault
were to eliminate the bitterness of the proceedings when intimate marital details had to be aired, and also to avoid the adversarial character of most divorces obtained on fault
grounds.36 Since society wished for easier divorce, laws were
passed to enact some form of no-fault divorce "to reflect the
growing
notion of marriage as a relationship terminable at
37
will."

In furthering these goals, no-fault divorce has succeeded. The
no-fault reform in effect has brought about unilateral divorce."

34. Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6-7 & n.l (1989).

Professor Ellman's article has been criticized for several of its ultimate conclusions
about alimony. His article, the criticism of it, and his response to the criticism will
be dealt with at length in Part IV, infra. See also Lichtenstein, supra note 10, at 4;
Wadlington, supra note 7, at 32, 33 & n.2.
35. Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 853 (N.Y. 1977) (stating that the
authenticity of a separation must be supported by a separation decree or agreement
and pointing out that "[tihis requirement as to a separation decree or agreement is
peculiar to New York and reflects legislative concern over the fraud and collusion
which historically infected divorce actions involving adultery"); Ellman, supra note 34,
at 7; see also Wadlington, supra note 7, at 35.
36. Mary F. Blackstone, The Fault Factor in No-Fault Divorce and Equitable
Distribution: Some Suggestions for Change in Wyoming, 20 LAND & WATER L. REv.
133, 135 (1985); see, e.g., Baxia v. Baxla, 522 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Eggmeyer v. Eggmeyer, 554 S.E.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
manifestly clear from the legislative history of many, if not all, of the
("It is...
statutes, that the purpose and intent of the legislatures of the various states, including Texas, is to abolish the necessity of presenting sordid and ugly details of
conduct on the part of either spouse to the marriage in order to obtain a decree of
divorce.").
37. Bea A. Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution
Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689, 695 (1990).
38. Ellman, supra note 34, at 7. A person who wants to end his or her marriage
may simply file for divorce, alleging that there are irreconcilable differences or that
the spouses have lived separate and apart for the requisite amount of time. See id.;
see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1995) (statutory grounds for divorce); Quinn v. Quinn, 288 A.2d 51, 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972) ("The rationale of the recent amendments to the Divorce Act (L.1971, c.212) is to terminate
dead marriages regardless of fault or lack of fault. . . . 'The object is to put an end
to a situation of the parties which is barren of good, capable of evil, and probably
irremediable by any other means."); In re Marriage of Clark, 538 P.2d 145, 147
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Since 1985, some form of no-fault divorce has been available in
all fifty states. The states differ in their methods for providing
no-fault divorce: some designate it as the sole grounds necessary for divorce (often calling it an "irretrievable breakdown" of
the marriage or "irreconcilable differences" among the spouses)
while other states have simply added no-fault in addition to the
existing fault grounds without repealing them.39 Approximately
eighteen states are in the first category and thirty states belong
to the second.4" The remaining states have opted for a provision which permits divorce after living separate and apart for a
certain period of time in addition to the fault grounds already
in place.4 1
B. Effects of the Abandonment of Fault
1. Economic Theory of Marriage
The no-fault reform was so widespread and overwhelming
that it has been termed the "divorce revolution."42 The new
laws shifted the focus of divorce proceedings from an inquiry
into moral fault and responsibility to an examination of economic issues concerning whether one spouse is financially in
need and whether the other spouse is capable of paying.' Although originally viewed as responding to a need to eliminate
moral fault from the divorce proceeding, no-fault reform quickly

(Wash. Ct. App. 1975) ("The 'underlying purpose of the new Dissolution of Marriage
Act is to replace the concept of 'fault' and substitute marriage failure or 'irretrievable
breakdown' as the basis for a decree dissolving a marriage." (citations omitted)).
39. Elrod & Walker, supra note 29, at 661.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 13, § 7.01(B).
43. Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181,
1184 (1981); see, e.g., Oppenheimer v. Oppenheimer, 526 P.2d 762, 768 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1974). In Oppenheimer, the Arizona Court of Appeals asserted that
fault is not an issue in granting dissolution. Fault has only limited relevance in awarding spousal maintenance, disposition of property, and child
support. It should only be considered to the extent that there are
"[e]xcessive or abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment or fraudulent disposition of community, joint tenancy and other property held in
common."
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assumed economic overtones, and now it is seen as a means of
empowering women and correcting economic inequalities between the sexes." In fact, one of the central objectives of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act' is to render women financially independent.46 This secondary aspect of the no-fault reform movement has been seen as an attempt to substitute property distribution upon dissolution of marriage for the lost promise of unending financial support which had been previously
guaranteed by marriage.4" One widely held conception is that
of marriage as an economic partnership, a productive unit to
which each spouse makes different but equal contributions in
an effort to maximize joint marital income.48 Thus, the legal
analysis of divorce law has shifted in the past twenty years
from a debate concerning whether marriage as an institution is
so valuable that there should be major impediments to its dissolution, to an effort to determine the most fair and equitable
methods to make the parties whole again once the marriage
has been terminated. Inevitably, the argument has become one
of competing economic analyses.
Alimony, now called spousal support, descends from the English ecclesiastical courts and was the traditional remedy for
wives who were not at fault in the termination of a marriage
and who, it was believed, retained a continuing entitlement to
marital support.49 Since the advent of no-fault divorce, however, this rationale for granting alimony awards in divorce pro-

44. Herma H. Kay, An Appraisal of California'sNo-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 291, 300-01 (1987) (discussing the California experience and the presumption
that community and quasi-community property be divided equally); see also Jane
Rutherford & Barbara Tishler, Equalizing the Cost of Divorce Under the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act: Maintenance Awards in Illinois, 23 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 459,
465 (1992).
45. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987).
46. Rutherford & Tishler, supra note 44, at 466-67 (citing In re Marriage of Wilder, 461 N.E.2d 447, 456 (I. App. Ct. 1983) ('The objective of the Act in authorizing
rehabilitative maintenance is to enable a formerly dependent spouse to become financially independent in the future.")).
47. Smith, supra note 37, at 695-96.
48. Id at 696; Robert F. Kelly & Greer L. Fox, Determinants of Alimony Awards:
An Empirical Test of Current Theories and a Reflection on Public Policy, 44 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 641, 652 (1993).
49. Garrison, supra note 2, at 626-27; see, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 429 A.2d 232,
236, 237 n.2 (Md. 1981); see also Ellman, supra note 34, at 5.
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ceedings has been undermined and property distribution has
become a focal point of divorce reform."
Although most states traditionally had distributed assets
upon divorce solely to the spouse with title, those states now
allow courts to reach more of the assets acquired during marriage through equitable distribution laws. 5' The assumptions
underlying the division of a greater scope of property upon dissolution were that the primary assets of the marriage were
typically the accumulated property of the spouses and that
these assets, once divided, would be sufficient to ensure that
both spouses would leave the marriage with the result of their
efforts during the marriage at least equally divided between
them.52
2. Consequences for Divorcing Spouses
The results of the divorce revolution have not been all that
was hoped for when the movement first began. One primary
goal of the reform movement, as alluded to earlier, was the
correction of inequities between husband and wife which became apparent when the marriage was dissolved. The husband
was typically the wage earner, and the wife was traditionally
the homemaker. Upon dissolution, the husband had an established career and job with which to support himself, while the
wife typically had nothing tangible to show for her years of
marriage. 3 The equitable distribution statutes were designed
50. Ellman, supra note 34, at 6; Garrison, supra note 2, at 629.
51. See Garrison, supra note 2, at 627-28; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West 1990
& Cum. Supp. 1995) (division of marital property upon dissolution of marriage); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1995) (marital property division upon dissolution of marriage); see also Blackstone, supra note 36, at 137-38 (historical overview
of property distribution at divorce).
52. See, e.g., G. Oliver Koppell, Commentary, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 777, 778 (1991).
Writing in response to an empirical study on the effects of equitable distribution laws
in New York, Mr. Koppell, Chair, New York State Assembly Committee on the Judiciary, stated
[if Professor Garrison's research had been available in 1979, those disappointed with the equitable distribution law would have known to begin
with that it wouldn't have solved the problems, because the money just
wasn't there. Unfortunately, we in the legislature didn't take the time to
determine how few people equitable distribution would affect.
Id.
53. See generally Ellman, supra note 34, at 42-43.
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to ameliorate this disparity.54 In this, no-fault reform has been
a singular failure.
Reformers of the 1960s and 1970s called not only for a replacement of the fault grounds for divorce with no-fault, but
also for a change in the treatment of spousal support as the
wife's primary economic entitlement.5 5 Reformers urged that
property should assume this role and they expected that property division would replace alimony as support for an exspouse. 5 They also felt that since marriage is a partnership of
equals, the financial aspects of divorce should be remodeled
accordingly, the logical outcome being a community property
system without alimony." None of the states went this far,
however, and spousal support is still available in all states. 5
Nonetheless, many states have enacted legislation reflecting the
view that such support is to be rehabilitative in nature so as to
allow the needy spouse to acquire whatever education and
training is needed to become self-sufficient.5 9
a. The California Experience
California adopted no-fault divorce in 1970, removing any
considerations of fault from the grounds for divorce, from
spousal support, and from the division of property. 0 California
was the first state to make such a move, and as such has led
the states in most of the no-fault reform movement's efforts.6

54. See Kay, supra note 44, at 300-01.
55. Garrison, supra note 2, at 629.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 630.
58. See Elrod & Walker, supra note 29, at 534-36. Twenty-four states consider
marital fault as a relevant factor in determining alimony, twenty-four do not (the
District of Columbia is included in the survey). Id.
59. Id. at 549-63.
60. In re Marriage of Fink, 126 Cal. Rptr. 626, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). In California:
A primary purpose of the Family Law Act was to remove from domestic
relations litigation the issue of marital fault as a determining factor. The
framers of the Act hoped that the new law would provide "practicable
procedures" for dissolving marriages where irreconcilable differences existed between the parties, procedures which reflected a realistic approach to
the problems involved.
Id. (citations omitted); see Kay, supra note 44, at 292.
61. Kay, supra note 44, at 292.

618

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:605

In California, a community property state, the courts treat
marriage as an equal partnership, and the distribution statute
instructs the courts to divide equally the community assets and
liabilities.62
One of the earliest studies to comprehensively examine the
effects of the equitable distribution statutes upon property and
support awards and the post-divorce standards of living of divorced parties and children following the enactment of no-fault
divorce was conducted by Dr. Lenore J. Weitzman in California
in 1981.63 Dr. Weitzman's study collected data from random
samples of court records in San Francisco and Los Angeles from
1968, 1972, and 1977. Her samples included over 500 cases per
year in each city.'
The data showed that because most divorcing couples were
young, they had relatively few assets, the worth of those assets
was typically low, and they had little or no property to divide.6 5 In addition, "the spouses' earning capacity [was] typically worth much more than the tangible assets of the marriage."66 The study indicated that most divorcing couples were
in lower income groups and that neither a home nor any other
tangible asset of major value was available to cushion the financial impact of divorce. 7 For these couples, the primary financial issues were spousal and child support.68 Dr. Weitzman
noted that there was a dramatic difference between results obtained under the new presumption of equal property division
than obtained under former fault provisions, where property
was usually divided unequally with the wife (usually the ag-

62. In re Marriage of Juick, 98 Cal. Rptr. 324, 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971);
Weitzman, supra note 43, at 1199.
63. Weitzman, supra note 43.
64. Weitzman, supra note 43, at 1186.
65. Id. at 1188. The average value of community property available for division
was $10,900 in 1978 dollars. Id. at 1190. This would leave the average spouse with
$5,450 worth of property awarded under equal division principles embodied in California law. See CAL. FAMILY CODE § 2550 (West 1994) (division of community property
to be equal except by agreement or stipulation of the parties).
66. Weitzman, supra note 43, at 1192.
67. Id. at 1197.
68. Id. Dr. Weitzman noted that even the ownership of a home and its equity
does not necessarily provide a sufficient financial cushion for couples who have
homes. Even in these cases, the wage and salary income was of much greater value
than the couple's community property. Id. at 1197 n.46.
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grieved party) receiving the majority of the property division.69
Whereas the marital home was usually awarded to the mother
of minor children under the old fault-based law, under the new
law the home was more likely to be sold with the proceeds
divided equally between the spouses.7"
Dr. Weitzman's data on alimony indicated that it was not
awarded in most divorce cases, and that this did not improve
under no-fault.71 The study indicated that in California the
mothers of young children had experienced a sharp drop in
spousal support awards under the new law.72 Another consequence of the new law was that most of the spousal support
awards that were granted were temporary in nature, rather
than permanent as had been the case under the old law.73
While minimal support was granted to divorcing spouses of a
marriage of long duration in about one-half of the cases, and in
two-thirds of cases involving long-married housewives, younger
women usually did not receive any support, and those that did
only received it for a short period.74
The study concluded that most men have much more disposable income after divorce than their former wives and children,
and hence, their economic status improves while that of divorced women declines.75 Divorced men gained a 42% improvement in their post-divorce standard of living (despite losing 19%

69. Id at 1200-01.
70. Md at 1264.
71. Id. at 1221. In 1977, only 17% of women who were divorced in California
received spousal support, whereas U.S. Bureau of Census data collected between 1887
and 1922 shows that alimony awards were only given in between 9% to 15% of cases.
Therefore, no-fault divorce laws are not responsible for a drastic reduction in alimony
awards. Id. The median amount awarded for spousal support in the 1977 sample was
$210 per month limited to two years. Id. at 1225.
72. Id. at 1222. Although most of these women had been awarded child support,
the study showed that these awards were rarely enough to cover one-half of the costs
of the children. Id.
73. Id- at 1226.
74. 1& at 1265. A different study of the financial consequences of divorce in California found that a number of variables, including the income of the two spouses and
the duration of the marriage were significant predictors of the probability and/or size
of awards. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEmmAS OF CUSTODY 124 (1992). Greater income of husbands increased the probability and size of an award to wives, while greater duration of the
marriage increased the amount of the award if one was given. Id.
75. Weitzman, supra note 43, at 1249.
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in real income), while divorced women's standard of living declined 73% (while losing 29% in real income).76
Dr. Weitzman made several policy recommendations aimed at
correcting some of the inequities of no-fault reform highlighted
by her study. These suggestions included: expansion of the
definition of community property to include career assets such
as professional degrees, adoption of spousal support rules which
would enable younger women to develop a greater earning capacity, and a return to more permanent forms of support for
older divorced women.77 This paper suggests one possible
framework for advancing some of the goals and curing some of
the inequities identified in Dr. Weitzman's study.78
b. The New York Experience
California is one of only nine community property states and
is one of only two states which mandate equal distribution of
property on divorce.79 Therefore, although its alimony statutes
are fairly mainstream, its property rules are atypical." It is
more useful to look at the results of no-fault divorce in a jurisdiction which is more in line with the majority of states to see
whether Dr. Weitzman's findings are equally relevant elsewhere
in the country.

76. Id. at 1249-51.
77. Id. at 1266-68. Dr. Weitzman's critique of no-fault divorce and her suggestions
for reform have been severely criticized by some feminists. See, e.g., Kay, supra note
44. Professor Kay is a "liberal feminist" who opposes the re-introduction of fault in
any form because she feels that it would encourage women to pursue traditional
homemaking roles and because she believes that the way to reduce women's dependence on their husbands is to reduce, not enlarge, financial support upon divorce.
June R. Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 992-94 (1991). In contrast,
Dr. Weitzman's views have been embraced by "cultural feminists" who question
whether women should be forced to make the same career decisions as men and
oppose laws that have the effect of penalizing women's different choices. Id. at 996.
Compare Herma H. Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce
and its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1987) with Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony
After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 23 NEW ENG. L. REv. 437 (1988).
78. See infra Part IV.
79. E.g., Elrod & Walker, supra note 29, at 695.
80. Garrison, supra note 2, at 636.
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New York still allows a showing of fault before granting
divorce, although there are now no-fault alternatives as well.8
In 1980, New York enacted an equitable property distribution
statute but did not alter the grounds for divorce.12 The equitable distribution statute is fairly typical, and it applies to property acquired during the marriage and excludes gifts, inheritances, and personal injury awards. Fault only plays a role in
distribution where it is egregious.' The legislation was expected to increase the assets that most spouses received upon divorce, especially since the statute expanded the property which
could be divided by ignoring legal title to assets and explicitly
instructed the courts to consider the contributions of a homeM This emphasis on
maker and parent in asset distribution."
need and nonmonetary contributions was specifically expected
to benefit women in divorces. 85
Professor Marsha Garrison conducted a study of New York
divorce cases in three diverse counties, one urban, one rural,
and one suburban. 8 She compared data from divorces adjudicated in 1978, before the enactment of the New York equitawith ones decided in 1984, four years after
ble distribution law,
8 7
effect.
took
law
the
The data revealed that husbands on average owned a significantly larger proportion of most couples' assets (as anticipated
by the legislature), but that husbands also tended to have larger debts, resulting in wives having a slightly higher median
81. N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol. 1995); In Christian v. Christian, the New
York Court of Appeals pointed out that
two new grounds for absolute divorce were specified[:] living apart pursuant to a separation decree or judgment and living separate and apart
pursuant to a written separation agreement.... These last two bases
have become known as the "no fault" grounds, since they were designed
to make separation a ground for divorce, regardless of fault, as long as
the authenticity of the separation is supported by a separation decree or
agreement.
365 N.E.2d 849, 852-53 (N.Y. 1977) (citations omitted).
82. Garrison, supra note 2, at 637.
83. Id. at 638-39; see O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 719 (N.Y. 1985);
McCann v. McCann, 593 N.Y.S.2d 917 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (stating that in order for
fault to impact on equitable distribution, it must "shock the conscience").
84. Garrison, supra note 2, at 651-52.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 643-44.
87. Id. at 641-43.
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individual net worth than husbands in 1984.8" In fact, more
than one-half of husbands had a net worth of less than $50.89
The value of marital property strongly correlated with family
income, such that families with an income of $25,000 per year
or less had a net asset value of less than $2000, while those
with a yearly income of greater than $75,000 had net assets
greater than $200,000." 0 These figures strongly resemble
Weitzman's figures for California and demonstrate the lack of
valuable marital property for distribution upon divorce in most
households."
The research further demonstrated that the single most important asset, and the one which exceeded the value of all other
assets, was the marital home.9 2 Both before and after the equitable distribution statute was passed, more than one-half of the
wives received more than 50% of the net worth of the marital
estate upon divorce." This average share is remarkably similar to the results of Dr. Weitzman's California study.9 4
One intended effect of the New York equitable distribution
law was its impact upon distribution in cases where the wife
was found to have committed a marital fault. In 1978, a judgment against the wife alone impacted adversely upon the size
of the net property award she received, while in 1984, the same
sort of judgment appeared to have no impact upon her share at
95
all.
The new law had dramatic effects on the frequency and duration of alimony awards, which declined by 43% in all categories
of divorce cases, and on the percentage of permanent alimony
awards, which was cut in half.9" The legislative goal of the
new statute was to increase the alimony recipient's opportunity
to achieve independence and to reduce permanent awards in

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 653-58.
Id. at 657-58.
Id. at 663. The median net worth of marital property was $23,591. Id.
Id. at 664. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 674.
See Weitzman, supra note 43, at 1201.
Garrison, supra note 2, at 694-95.
Id. at 697-98. From 21% of all divorcing couples in 1978 to 12% in 1984. Id.
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favor of temporary "rehabilitative" support awards. 7 Therefore,
the decline in alimony was not unexpected, although predicting
which spouses would receive alimony awards was not made any
easier. 8 Professor Garrison concluded that alimony decisions
seemed to be based on some rational, quantifiable factors such
as length of marriage and earning potential, but that other
factors, which she could not explain from the information available in court records, also appeared to determine which spouses
received alimony.99 Thus it appears that there are either gaps
in the rationale for alimony, or that the courts need more
guidance00for
determining when and on what basis to award
°
alimony.
Professor Garrison also listed her findings comparing postdivorce per capita income for husbands and wives along with
findings reported by other researchers:
Research Site

Husband

Wife

(Average %
Change)

(Average %
Change)

Anchorage, Alaska

+ 17%

-

33%

New Haven, Connecticut

+ 90%

-

31%

Los Angeles & San
Francisco, California

-21%

Five Counties, Vermont

+ 120%

New York/Onondaga/
Westchester, New York

+82%

97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
See
Id.
Id.

at 698-99.
id. at 698-700.
at 711.
at 734-36; see infra parts IV-V.

-

33%

-32%
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This chart'
shows that the results obtained in Professor
Garrison's research are not isolated to one geographic area and
are in fact quite representative of the economic fortunes of
divorced persons across the nation.
Professor Garrison suggests that her research demonstrates
that the lack of alimony awards across the nation should not be
blamed on the loss of wives' ability to block divorce, since that
ability remains intact in New York.' °2 She posits that the
rules concerning the entitlements of spouses upon divorce appear to be more important to the financial well-being of spouses
than are the grounds of divorce, and she argues that what is
necessary is revision of those rules based upon a good understanding of the outcomes under current guidelines.' She also
notes that property distribution, in light of her findings, should
not be the primary method for achieving an equitable distribution of the hardships of divorce between the parties.' Rather,
more definite standards specifying a method for computing the
alimony 0award are needed to govern the allocation of spousal
support.' 5
Marital property alone, in the majority of cases, is clearly
insufficient to provide either spouse with the financial resources
necessary to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage. This reality should once and for all negate the idea
that spouses can somehow be "made whole" after divorce by
simply distributing the assets gained during marriage. We now
know that there is not enough property in most marriages to
accomplish this. By the same token, alimony is granted in only
a small minority of cases.'0 '
To be sure, it appears that even with a shift in the policy
governing spousal support in favor of an increase in the number of such awards, neither spouse will truly be in the same
financial position separately as they were as a complete eco-

101. Garrison, supra note 2, at 721. The data for Los Angeles and San Francisco
was obtained by researchers who recomputed data from Dr. Weitzman's study. Id.
102. Id. at 724. New York's no-fault divorce options are based on mutual consent.
Id.; see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(5), (6) (Consol. 1995).
103. Garrison, supra note 2, at 724-25.
104. Id. at 729-30.
105. Id. at 737-39.
106. See supra notes 60-105 and accompanying text.
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nomic unit. However, the disparities can be rendered less significant than they are under current law by adopting a policy
which provides firm guidelines and directs courts to award
spousal support in all cases which fall within those guidelines.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING ALIMONY AND PROPERTY
DIVISION WHICH RETAINS AND USES FAULT

The inquiry thus turns to fashioning a system which takes
into account the realities of the economic positions of spouses in
most divorces as revealed by the empirical studies conducted by
Dr. Weitzman and Professor Garrison. Now, twenty-five years
after the advent of no-fault divorce, it should be possible to
acknowledge the impact of no-fault upon marriage and divorce,
and to fashion a remedy which more fully redresses the disparities between men and women after marital dissolution. With
the dawning realization that property distribution is not the
increasingpanacea it was originally hoped to be, commentators
10 7
ly are turning their attention to alimony.
Professor Ira Ellman developed a doctrinal analysis of alimony in which he discarded the old rationales for its existence
and developed a new economic theory centered on the concept
He argues persuasively that modern
of opportunity costs.'
reforms have robbed alimony of any consistent theory to justify
its continued validity." 9 While many jurisdictions appear to
rely on the concept of "need" in their awards of spousal support, the definition of such need is hopelessly confused and
varies from case to case." 0 Professor Ellman notes that no
one can explain why alimony should be awarded although every
jurisdiction retains it."'
Professor Ellman's theory has been severely criticized. This
section first sets out his theory as initially explained by him in
1989. Next, two cogent critiques of his analysis are discussed.

107. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Commentary: Meeting the Financial Needs of
Children, 57 BROOK L. REV. 769, 771 (1991); O'Connell, supra note 77.
108. See Ellman, supra note 34, at 12.
109. See id. at 3-13.
110. Id. at 4.
111. Id. at 4-5.
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The section concludes with Professor Ellman's response to the
criticism.
A. Ellman's Theory
Professor Ellman contends that the contract analogy, which is
often used by courts to describe marriage, fails to satisfactorily
define the relationship between the parties because marriage
has been treated as a status, with the parties' rights and responsibilities fixed by statute rather than by agreement between them."2 The essential problem with a contract analysis
is defining the agreement between the parties.'
Accepting
this contract analogy would allow awards to be fixed according
to the contractual obligation of the parties, one of whom has
breached the agreement." Unfortunately, the analysis fails at
this point precisely because very few couples enter into marriage with the same understanding of the "contract." As Professor Ellman notes:
[O]ne might well argue that couples divorce precisely because they discover, as specific issues arise after some years
of marriage, that in fact there never was a clear contract,
that they do not have the same understanding of their
mutual commitment.... A court would typically have no
basis for deciding which understanding was correct. The
spouses' "agreement" was simply too vague to provide a
court with sufficient guidance to determine whether it has
been breached." 5
Because contract principles cannot provide an acceptable outcome in most cases, the courts tend to use contract language
while in fact fashioning a remedy which reflects their own
views of the equities involved 16 and their own concepts of an
appropriate marital "contract.""
The analogy of marriage as a partnership is likewise rejected
by Professor Ellman because it is not helpful in the marriage

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 13; see also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888).
Ellman, supra note 34, at 15.
See id., at 14-20.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 23.
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context. Professor Ellman argues that partnership law principles work in the business context because courts can assume
that the primary goal of all partners is to maximize profits and
that expectations can be evaluated in light of this motivation.
However, in the marriage context, courts have no guidance to
render judgment beyond their own preferences and expectations. 7
Professor Ellman contends that alimony can be justified on
social policy grounds. He states that legal doctrines concerning
marriage and divorce should be based on the encouragement of
a sharing behavior in marriages and an elimination of "distorting incentives."
By reconceptualizing alimony, he proposes a
system for accomplishing this goal."' He focuses on the traditional wife as a homemaker because currently this model still
comprises a significant percentage of marital arrangements, and
the homemaker spouse is the most disadvantaged in divorce."2 At the same time, he declares that the theoretical
model he advances also applies to marriages where both spouses have careers.' The core of the analysis rests on the fact
that the traditional marriage involves considerable up-front
investment by the wife, because she forsakes her career opportunities and other marital opportunities--"investments that a
self-interested bargainer would make only in return for a longterm commitment."2 The husband, on the other hand, realizes a gain from the marriage in the early years through increased earning capacity and the care of his children at
home.' His contributions to the marriage will not come into
full fruition until the later years, when his wife will be able to

117. Id. at 40.
118. Id. at 40-81. 'Distorting incentives" are incentives created by modern divorce
law which offer one spouse an economic advantage over the other that can be
achieved by ending the marriage. Id. at 50 n.143. These incentives are avoided by
allocating the economic consequences of a failed marriage appropriately between the
parties. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 40-48.
121. I& at 40-41.
122. Id. at 42; see also GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981) (providing an economic analysis of specialization by spouses in marriage to allocate labor
and analyzing marriage and divorce from an economic perspective).
123. Ellman, supra note 34, at 42.
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share in the benefits of his enhanced earning capacity.' This
model will alter somewhat with a dual-income couple, but in
that case the spouse with the lower earning potential will usually make sacrifices in his or her career (although this still
tends to be the wife)" to benefit the economic fortunes of the
marriage as a whole. 2 '
The function of alimony in Professor Ellman's view, therefore,
is to reallocate the financial consequences of divorce to prevent
the economic incentive of the higher-earning spouses (generally
husbands) to "fire" their spouses when they have obtained the
benefits of the marriage and before they have begun to deliver
to their wives the benefits for which the initial sacrifices were
made (long-term companionship and higher standard of living
in later life). This is considered a remedy of one spouse against
the other. 7 This theory of alimony conceptualizes spousal
support as an entitlement earned by the economically disadvantaged spouse through marital investments and as a tool to
eliminate distorting financial incentives in marriage, not as a
way of relieving need as the current law prescribes."
Professor Ellman sets out several principles and rules which
courts could follow in fashioning a remedy under his theory.
For the purposes of our discussion, these principles are set out
below and this article will later address how fault may be made
a part of this framework in providing guidance to the courts.
Principle One: A spouse is entitled to alimony only when
he or she has made a marital investment resulting in a
postmarriage reduction in earning capacity....
Rule 1.1: There is no compensation on divorce for the lost
opportunity to have chosen a different spouse, or for the
nonfinancial losses arising from the failed marriage....

124. Id. at 42-43.
125. This assumption will probably hold true for a few more years, but see Sam
Roberts, Black Women Making Financial Strides, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 1,

1994, at A2, for a discussion of how recent black women college graduates have begun to earn more than both white women and black men college graduates. In a few
years there will hopefully be less disparity between the sexes in earning potential,
but this does not change the application of Professor Ellman's analysis.
126. Ellman, supra note 34, at 46-47.
127. Id. at 50.
128. Id. at 52.
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Principle Two: Except as provided in Principle Three,
only financially rational sharing behavior qualifies as marital investment giving rise to a compensable loss in earning
capacity....
Rule 2.1: A loss of earning capacity incurred to accommodate a spouse's lifestyle preferences, yielding a reduction in
aggregate marital income, is not compensable [for the
spouse whose preference was accommodated]....
Rule 2.2: The claimant spouse is ordinarily entitled to
recover the full value of her lost earning capacity. Where,
however, no increase in marital income in fact resulted
from her marital investment, she has no claim under Principles One and Two....

Principle Three: Notwithstanding Principle Two and Rule
2.2, the homemaker spouse may claim half the value of her
lost earning capacity, even though it exceeds the market
value of her domestic services, when these services include
primary responsibility for the care of children."9
Thus, the theory advanced by Professor Ellman measures
alimony claims by losses in earning capacity rather than other
standards currently used by the courts, which we have seen
yield disappointing results. The types of spouses who will have
claims under this measure are primarily spouses who have
given up careers in order to take care of children and spouses
who have subrogated their career and earning prospects to that
of his or her spouse to accommodate that spouse's more lucrative prospects. 3 ° Therefore, some spouses who would have no
claim under this theory might have a claim under current law
because they would be considered in need.'3 '
One situation which Professor Ellman sets forth as a problem
case is where a woman who wants to be a traditional homemaker spouse never seeks to develop her market talents.'3 2
No effort to describe a loss of earning capacity will ring true in
this case, and her real loss is the marriage itself, which is
significant because she may never again be able to find a suitable mate.' Professor Ellman states that the only fault of at

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id at 53-73.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id. at 80.
Id.
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least some of these women will be having made the wrong
choice of husbands." In these cases, the lost earning capacity
may be too speculative to be calculated. This problem is not
insurmountable, and indeed the proposed form of alimony set
forth in Part V provides at the very worst a minimum threshold amount of alimony.
A greater problem for Professor Ellman's theory lies in the
criticism levelled at it from various circles. The following sections contain two well-crafted and persuasive views concerning
the theory's shortcomings.
B. Criticism of Ellman
1. Feminist Dissent
Criticizing Professor Ellman for ignoring the ongoing debate
concerning gender neutral divorce laws which make no allowance for women's continuing domestic roles, Professor June
Carbone mounts a frontal attack on his theory by assaulting
the theme that women should specialize in domestic matters."5 Professor Carbone states that Professor Ellman's theory ("the Theory"), by increasing women's dependence on their
husbands and providing an economic incentive for women to
specialize in domestic roles, would serve only to reinforce existing gender inequalities.'36
Professor Carbone's article reveals that Ellman's Theory
draws on efficiency principles to argue that alimony should be
formulated to encourage specialization.'37 She states that the
Theory's rationale is to
deter inefficient divorce and encourage reliance over the life
of the marriage, [which] is the classic justification for expectation damages .... Ellman ...rejects the possibility of

defining marital obligations [which would be necessary to
enforce expectation damages], and his proposals, although

134. Id.
135. June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply
to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1463-65 (1990).
136. Id. at 1465.
137. Id. at 1464.
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dressed in the language of reliance, reinvent alimony as a
form of restitution.'38
Restitution provides a way to compensate for benefits conferred at the other spouse's expense.'39 Therefore, the Theory
in fact rests upon contract principles, notwithstanding Professor
Ellman's protestations to the contrary.'
The Theory avoids
acknowledging its contractual basis because Professor Ellman
wished to address what the rules governing divorce should be
without the pretense that those rules necessarily embody the
parties' intentions.'
As Professor Carbone correctly points out, to justify that one
party continue to enjoy the standard of living established during marriage at the other's expense after divorce, there "must
be a reason to believe that the marriage should have endured,
such as an enforceable promise to remain married until 'death
do us part,' and some reason to impose responsibility for the
marriage's failure on the paying party."' It seems that consideration of fault in awarding alimony would provide such
justification.'
Changing the terminology from contractual to
noncontractual does not eliminate the need to make a determination of which party "breached" or was at fault.t Professor
Carbone states:
If Ellman were serious about deterring older men from
running off with younger women and leaving their wives
with few prospects for remarriage, he would propose an
expectation system of damages that would enable the wife
to enjoy the financial position she would have had had the
marriage continued, whether or not she had suffered a loss
of earning potential. This system would, in Ellman's terms,
reallocate the loss imposed by the divorce, requiring the
husband to consider the wife's losses as well as his own
gains in deciding whether to seek a divorce ....

[H]owever,

Ellman can do this only if he recognizes marriage as a

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1466.
Id.
Id at 1467.
Id. at 1469.
Id. at 1475.
See id. at 1476.
Id.
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lifelong commitment and ties such an award to a determination that the husband breached the obligation to remain
married.'
Professor Carbone posits restitution as the basis of Professor
Ellman's theory, but finds that this renders the Theory's rationale-the need to discourage divorce and encourage specialization-inconsistent with its restitutionary nature.'
She uses
contract principles to conclude that removing "distorting incentives" is not an appropriate basis for choosing restitution over
expectation and reliance damages.'47
The real problem that Professor Carbone sees in the Theory
is that it ignores and, in her eyes, completely fails to encourage
the larger interests of society, including child rearing, married
women's participation in the work force, and sexual equality.' She agrees that a modern theory of alimony should be
noncontractual, but it must take into account wider
externalities in order to provide a comprehensive rationale for
its implementation.4
Professor Carbone evaluates the Theory by considering the
societal results of no-fault divorce and the elimination of any
scrutiny of marital conduct. She finds that the need-based standard adopted by California and other states for spousal support
awards falls short of protecting the standard of living enjoyed
during marriage and also fails to guarantee the return of an
appropriate share of the benefits the other spouse retains after
divorce. 5 ° The current system effectively encourages divorce,

145. Id. at 1481 n.78.
146. Id. at 1485.
147. Id. at 1487-88. Professor Carbone demonstrates that the Theory seeks to accomplish an "efficient breach" by imposing the nonbreaching party's losses on the
breaching party, but economists find that only expectation damages are appropriate in
such cases to remove the distorting incentives that encourage divorce. Id. at 1485-86.
"Economists also argue, however, that only restitution, not expectation or reliance,
can supply efficient incentives for reliance over the course of the contract," encouraging the nonbreaching party to weigh the investment's advantages against the possibility that the other party will breach the agreement. Id. at 1486-87. No single efficient solution exists, but the choice of remedies depends on whether one wishes to
deter inefficient breach or overreliance. Id. at 1487.
148. Id. at 1491.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1492-93.
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and discourages reliance on the marriage, whether efficient or
not.'51 In the end, Professor Carbone finds herself endorsing a
contract-based restitution system, such as that advocated by
Professor Ellman (but not acknowledged by him as such). This
restitution system would simultaneously reward the contributions married women make to child rearing and the sacrifices
inherent in two-career families, as well as provide two advantages: (1) women would be encouraged to do as much as possible to enhance their earning potential; and (2) the "breaching
party" would have to weigh the costs to him or her of paying
damages if he or she breaks off the life-long conrestitution
1 52
tract.
In endorsing the Theory, Professor Carbone also reiterates
her doubt concerning Professor Ellman's belief that changing
social views have made it impossible to determine whether
marital obligations have been breached. She points out that
nineteenth century judges displayed little hesitation in
judging marital conduct amidst the changing social mores of
those times, and modern judges in states that permit consideration of marital misconduct to continue to influence
financial awards similarly demonstrate their ability to reach
principled conclusions. The issue is not so much whether

such determinations are possible as whether they are worth
the effort.... Fault fell into disrepute not because it be-

came indeterminate, but because it became irrelevant to the
permissibility of divorce. Its role in the financial dispositions made upon divorce has never really been examined

independently of its role as a prerequisite for divorce."
As will be demonstrated in the following section, marital obligations can be determined, and it is necessary to account for
them in order to provide a morally justifiable rationale for
causing one spouse to pay alimony to a former spouse.

151. Id. at 1493.
152. Id. at 1493-94.
153. Id- at 1494 & n.143 (citations omitted).
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2. Moral Dissent
Professor Carl Schneider wrote an insightful article which
praised the Theory for its attempt to provide a coherent rationale for alimony, but also criticized it for its refusal to acknowledge any moral discourse on the subject of awarding alimony.M Professor Schneider stated that American family law in
general has experienced "a diminution of the law's discourse in
moral terms about the relations between family members, and
the transfer of many moral decisions from the law to the people
the law once regulated."'5 5 He also expressed his doubt that
any law of alimony may be based on morally neutral terms or
successfully prevent courts from considering spouses' moral
relations in awarding alimony.5 6
Professor Schneider's first problem with the Theory concerns
its stated purpose of creating incentives which will affect the
behavior of married couples.15 He believes that the Theory is
so narrowly structured and complex that its incentives and
disincentives cannot be easily communicated to those whose
behavior it is intended to affect; thus, a wife might make a
sacrifice for her husband believing that she will be reimbursed
should divorce occur only to find out that she will not be because her sacrifice was economically irrational.'5 8 The Theory
relies on economic reasoning, but most people do not see marriage in those terms.
Professor Schneider next questions whether the kind of marital sharing sought to be promoted by the Theory should be
promoted at the expense of other marital goals.' He points
out that one possible effect of the Theory might be to "induce
the wife to abandon her career, since it allows her to do so
without financial risk" to herself, which might be exactly what

154. Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 197.
155. Id. at 198 (quoting Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1807-08 (1985)).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 208.
158. Id. at 208-09.
159. Id. at 218.
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she wishes. 6 ' If so, it may not be a sacrifice to her personally,
and therefore, one may question whether it should be compensated upon divorce. Professor Schneider also takes issue with
the proposition that optimization of family income is necessarily
the purpose of marriage-many people would feel such a system
sends an improper message about the nature of marriage. 6 '
The Theory's shortcomings as an economic model are summed
up as follows:
First, all transactions except financial transactions are excluded from the model. Second, all financial transactions
except those between one or both of the spouses on one
hand and outsiders on the other are excluded. Even financial transactions with outsiders seem to be limited to wageearning and entrepreneurial activities. Within this small
world, the theory applies a test of maximizing joint financial wealth. Yet economists regularly deal, for example, with
trade-offs between wealth and leisure, with psychic income
in numerous forms, and so on. '
Professor Schneider concludes that the Theory is "unmanageable in practice," although he is interested in it for its theoretical treatment of alimony and its refusal to consider moral
choices.'"
Professor Schneider believes that many of the shortcomings
of the Theory are related to its attempt to justify alimony in
morally neutral terms, and he feels that neither legislatures
nor the courts can exclude moral relations between spouses in
their decisions concerning alimony."M The Theory speaks in
exclusively economic terms, but the law in fact conceives of
families in a combination of economic, social, psychological, and
moral terms.'65 Professor Schneider argues that the law of alimony ought not penalize spouses for their generosity to each
other by refusing to account for it in setting alimony.'6 6

160. I& at 219.
161. Id. at 218-19.
162. Id. at 233.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 234-35.
165. Id. at 242.
166. Id. "Whatever alimony rules we write (even if we write none) will affect the
incentive structure of marital decisions and thus will (potentially) affect the moral
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The true failing of the Theory, in Professor Schneider's view,
lies in its blindness to morality.'6 7 He argues that it sets
bright-line rules in a category of cases where the individualized
circumstances and moral ramifications matter the most to the
participants.'
Moreover, he asserts that people legitimately
expect that their most meaningful relationships will not be
dissolved and their assets distributed without taking into account the relative merits of the parties.'6 9 Professor Schneider
notes that much of the appeal of the Theory lies in its accord
with widely held moral views. 7 ° It deals appropriately with
the almost clich6 case in which a wife makes a genuine sacrifice for the sake of her husband and family, providing him with
services which she dislikes, and doing so in obedience to social
pressures.'' The husband encourages this and his career is
directly benefitted by her sacrifice, which she has made in the
belief that the marriage will be permanent, or at least that
both spouses will do their utmost to make it so.'72 The husband divorces her unjustly, and thereafter she must shoulder
the burden of raising the children, but with less earning power
and fewer assets. 7 s Meanwhile, the husband is free to continue his career unencumbered by the burden of child rearing, and
he may even improve his standard of living. 74 It is in this
framework, notes Professor Schneider, that the Theory is most
persuasive, precisely because it "does not require us to ignore
the moral relations of the parties."'7 5 The Theory is correspondingly less compelling where a wife's sacrifice is deemed
financially irrational.'76

relations of the parties. Therefore any position the law of alimony takes must have
moral consequences, even if none are explicitly intended." Id at 236. "The Theory
does not profess to escape choices of this kind entirely. . . . But it is half-hearted
and ambivalent about doing so, and thus never asks what 'kind of marital behavior
we want' with enough persistence to yield persuasive and useful answers." Id at 241.
167. See id. at 243.
168. Id. at 244.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 246.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 246-47.
174. Id. at 247.
175. Id. at 246-47.
176. Id. at 248. For instance, taking the same fact pattern, but adding that the
wife's sacrifice is financially irrational under the Theory because it is made to accom-
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Professor Schneider agrees with the Theory that need alone
is not a sufficient basis for awarding alimony. He states that,
[olne spouse may come to owe the other support after marriage because of the moral relationship between spouses
that are generally part of marriage. In short, the riddle of
alimony has a traditional answer. It is not that need gives

rise to obligation. It is that entering into the special relationship that is marriage and behaving in some kinds of
ways in that relationehip can give rise to an obligation to a
former spouse who is in need. 77
As Professor Schneider points out, contrary to the assertion in
the Theory that the modern divorce reform movement has rejected all fault reasoning, fault still must be taken into account
in many jurisdictions in awarding alimony.'78 He concurs with
Professor Carbone's opinion that there is more agreement about
modern marital expectations than the Theory suggests, and
that judges and courts have traditionally been able to perform
this analysis. 9
As Professor Schneider suggests, a broader view of alimony
will require a great degree of discretion by the court, 8t but
this would not be a radical proposition. Courts have always
been granted wide latitude in awarding alimony, and even
though that discretion has been limited by the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, the Act continues to accord much latitude to judges in determining property distribution."' Whether or not more discretion is granted for alimony decisions, it
seems clear that some element of moral discourse must attend
any proposed standard for awarding alimony.'82

modate the husband's preference for a lower-paying job in a rural locale, it seems
unjust, in moral terms, to deny the wife any support simply because her acquiescence
to her husband's wishes did not result in a net financial gain for the couple.
177. Id. at 248-49.
178. Id at 249-50. Twenty-four jurisdictions consider marital fault relevant in
awarding alimony. Elrod & Walker, supra note 29, at 534.
179. Schneider, supra note 154, at 251.
180. Id. at 252.
181. Id. at 253.
182. See id.
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C. Ellman's Response
Professor Ellman responded to the criticism levelled at the
Theory by attempting to clarify his reasoning." He is partially successful in that he explains how his Theory will encourage
the participation of women in the work force, but he fails to
persuasively establish that moral relations must be disregarded
in determining alimony.
Professor Ellman begins his response by once again dismissing marital fault because considerations of fault in determining
alimony are allowed in only a minority of jurisdictions."M
However, this justification rings hollow; this is a minority view,
but barely so. Twenty-four jurisdictions still consider marital
fault in awarding alimony, while twenty-seven states do not
consider it. 5' Thirty states retain fault grounds for dissolving
the marital relationship." 6 Dismissing fault from consideration because it is a factor in only a "small minority" of states
seems almost ludicrous in view of the facts. Apparently many
legislatures have not been so overcome by the charms of nofault as to wish to repeal the fault remedies entirely. Thus, in
this area, Professor Ellman has failed to honestly consider
whether moral relations should be factored into alimony. A
shrug is not an argument.
Professor Ellman explains that the measure of alimony under
the Theory is "a reliance measure of the [sacrificing] spouse's
loss." '8 However, his explanation actually describes a hybrid
award somewhere between reliance and expectation damages.'" The Theory compensates for the difference between the
spouse's economic status at divorce and the status she would
have attained had she not engaged in marital sharing behav-

183. Ira M. Ellman, Should The Theory of Alimony Include Nonfinancial Losses
and Motivations?, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 259.
184. Id. at 262.
185. Elrod & Walker, supra note 29, at 534. The District of Columbia is included
in these figures. Id.
186. Id. at 661.
187. Ellman, supra note 183, at 273.
188. But see id. at 273-74 (explaining why "[reliance is a better measure than
expectation").
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ior.'89 Reliance damages put the non-breaching party in the
position she would have been in had there never been a contract, but without recompensing for lost opportunity." Expectation damages, on the other hand, put her in the position she
would have been in had the contract been carried to fruition.19 ' Restitution restores to the non-breaching party any
benefit she has conferred on the breaching party.'92 The Theory looks not only at the spouse's position before making her
sacrifice, but also at where her career opportunities would have
taken her had she not made the sacrifice.'9 3 This seems to be
why Professor Carbone concluded that the theory is in fact
It appears that Professor Ellman attempts to
restitution.'
provide, as a measure of the benefit conferred on the husband,
the lost career opportunities of the wife. Professor Ellman
states that this must be done because otherwise the wife "does
not lay out [any] funds as part of her reliance."'9 5 Professor
Carbone's contention is that the wife in fact has "laid out
funds." Those things which the spouse contributes in the form
of housekeeping and child rearing are in fact valuable and
present investments, but are ignored by the Theory. 9 ' Professor Carbone appears to initially propose that expectation would
be the correct measure of damages to determine alimony under
the Theory. 97 However, because expectation would require a
showing of breach (or fault), she adopted the path of least resistance in current academic circles by agreeing that determination of marital fault is not desirable.' 8 Accordingly, she states
that "the purposes such a determination would serve are questionable in themselves and most likely are not worth the costs
that an inquiry into marital conduct would impose on the judicial system."9

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
47 and
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 273.
Id. at 273 & n.34.
See id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(c) (1981).
Ellman, supra note 183, at 273.
See generally Carbone, supra note 135, at 1471-85; see also supra notes 146accompanying text.
Ellman, supra note 183, at 273 n.34.
Carbone, supra note 135, at 1481-83.
Id. at 1466.
Id. at 1496.
Id at 1496-97.
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Professor Ellman does, to a certain extent, answer the critique of what behavior his Theory recompenses. He states that
it deals only with that behavior which can be quantified. °
The other forms of behavior highlighted by Professors Carbone
and Schneider are too abstract, in his view, to be reduced to
numbers. He further explains that the Theory encourages
women's participation in the job market because it makes the
wife's loss the measure of the husband's alimony obligation,
recompensing the more talented wife who makes greater career
sacrifices.2°1
In sum, it is clear that the Theory is far from perfect. However, it is a worthwhile attempt to fashion a better alimony
award than currently obtained in the judicial system. As observed in Part III, need-based spousal support has not produced
the desired effects, and it has served to make women suffer
disproportionately the economic effects of divorce. In the next
Part, we will examine whether the Theory may be combined
with existing fault principles to fashion a more equitable remedy.
V.

ALIMONY AND FAULT

The ultimate question postulated in this paper is whether
there still exists a proper role for fault in modern spousal support rights upon divorce, and if so, what that role might be.
Professor Ellman spoke of attempting to eliminate "distorting
incentives" which he felt contribute to the current high divorce
rate and the disproportionate consequences of divorce upon
women.202 It seems strange, however, to speak of incentives
and disincentives in the arena of divorce while entirely disregarding the possibility that traditional fault concepts might
prove valuable.
The whole notion of fault proves to be a stumbling block for
many scholars writing about the current pursuit of equitable
ways of dealing with alimony. 23 However, as noted earlier,
200.
arising
201.
202.
203.

Ellman, supra note 183, at 285. "Under*The Theory only lost earning capacity
from 'marital sharing behavior' is compensable." Id.
Id. at 287-88.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
Some refuse to consider it. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 34, at 6 (stating that
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fault provides an excellent tool to encourage the type of behavior society believes to be appropriate in marriage, and to discourage that behavior which society deems to be inappropriate.2" 4 It seems that most people would at least agree that engaging in adultery, cruelty, or desertion is not the sort of sharing behavior which marriage should have to endure. In order to
provide a disincentive for such behavior, there should be concomitant post-divorce financial consequences for engaging in
inappropriate behavior.
A. A Proposed Structure for Spousal Support in Virginia
Professor Ellman was unwilling to use fault principles in
providing a rationale for alimony, and, although she ultimately
rejected this approach, Professor Carbone acknowledged that in
order to justify expectation damages there would have to exist
an enforceable promise to remain married until death-or at
least to not engage in behavior which will destroy the marriage."' This paper is not similarly inhibited regarding fault
principles.
It should be reiterated that this paper does not argue for reinjecting fault into the process of obtaining a divorce. Rather, it
suggests one way to re-inject more equity into the post-divorce
financial consequences of spouses. In tort, the law provides a
remedy for intentional actions which cause harm, negligent
actions which result in harm, and even for some activities
where no proof of negligence is necessary, such as product liability.0 6 Only in the dissolution of marriage does the law currently seem to ignore even the most egregious of actions by a
person toward his or her spouse and provide no compensation
for the action." ' The relationship between spouses could be

any justification for alimony provided by a fault system "has been undermined completely by the modern divorce reform movement of the last twenty years, which
makes fault irrelevant and rejects gender roles"); Ellman, supra note 183, at 262.
Some scholars find fault simply not worth pursuing. See, e.g., Carbone, supra note
135, at 1496-97; Kay, supra note 44, at 299; Lichtenstein, supra note 10, at 15.
204. See supra Part IV.B.
205. See supra text accompanying note 142.
206. See, e.g., Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 180-83 (1st Cir. 1974).
207. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 378 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (disallowing alimony granted to a wife whose husband had physically abused her during
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viewed as that of co-fiduciaries, and as such, the breach of the
marital partner's trust is all the more egregious and deserving
of compensation. Marriage is the only relationship in which a
party may blithely wreak havoc upon another's life only to have
the law shield the behavior through no-fault divorce rather
than deter the behavior as it did in the past. Where there is
fault, there should be consequence.
Most people understand the notion of marital fault. They
understand that society should set bare minimum standards of
marital conduct to which all spouses will be held. This understanding meets Professor Schneider's insightful contention,
discussed in Part IV, that if a law is going to serve a hortatory
function, then it must be understood by those whose behavior it
is intended to affect."' Thus, fault serves to enforce accountability, and its use in determining alimony has moral implications which will be understood by those whose behavior it is
intended to affect.
In view of the lack of property available to most couples for
division upon divorce," 9 alimony should become the courts'
primary tool in fixing equitable results upon divorce. Consequently, alimony must become more available to the courts so
that it may be employed in more cases.
In Virginia, fault continues to be an alternative ground for
divorce, in addition to living separate and apart for a period of
one year, or six months if there are no minor children and the
parties have entered into a separation agreement.210 Fault is
often an issue in Virginia divorce cases because adultery, sodomy and buggery are absolute bars to entitlement to spousal
support, and because fault is a statutory factor to be considered

the marriage because in the appellate court's view the alimony was used as a "substitute for a money judgment in a personal injury case").
208. See supra text accompanying notes 157-58.
209. See supra Part III.B.2.
210. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1995). The fault grounds are: (1)
adultery, sodomy or buggery committed outside the marriage; (2) where either party
is convicted of a felony subsequent to the marriage, is sentenced to confinement for
more than one year and is so confined for this felony, and "cohabitation has not been
resumed after knowledge of such confinement;" and (3) "where either party has been
guilty of cruelty, caused reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt, or willfully deserted
or abandoned the other" (a divorce decree may be issued after one year from the date
of the act). Id.
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in the decision whether to grant support and in determining
the equitable distribution of marital property."' In light of the
small value of marital property available for division upon divorce in most cases and the fact that fault may act as a complete bar to spousal support, it might be appropriate for fault to
assume a somewhat different role in Virginia.
Current Virginia law states that, in determining whether to
award spousal support, the court must "consider the circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of the
marriage, specifically including adultery and any other ground
for divorce under the provisions of subdivisions (3) or (6) of 2091 or 20-95. "21 If the court decides that spousal support is
warranted, then it must consider the following statutory factors:
1. The earning capacity, obligations, needs and financial
resources of the parties, including but not limited to income
from all pension, profit sharing or retirement plans, of
whatever nature;
2. The education and training of the parties and the
ability and opportunity of the parties to secure such education and training;
3. The standard of living established during the marriage;
4. The duration of the marriage;
5. The age and physical and mental condition of the
parties;
6. The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each
party to the well-being of the family;
7. The property interests of the parties, both real and
personal, tangible and intangible;
8. The provisions made with regard to the marital property under § 20-107.3; and
9. Such other factors, including the tax consequences to
each party, as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.1 3

211. Id. §§ 20-107.1 to -107.3(E).

212. Id. § 20-107.1. Adultery is codified at § 20-91(1); conviction of a felony is at §
20-91(3); and cruelty is at § 20-91(6). Section 20-95 lists grounds for divorce from bed
and board, which are cruelty, reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt, and willful
desertion or abandonment.
213. Id. § 20-107.1.
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Additionally, no spousal support will be awarded from a spouse
who has the ground of adultery, sodomy, or buggery in his or
her favor except where denial of such support would constitute
manifest injustice.1
To find manifest injustice in denying
spousal support, the court must base its finding on the comparative economic circumstances of the parties and the respective
degrees of fault." 5 The fault during the marriage which the
court must consider in determining manifest injustice includes
all behavior that affected the marital relationship.2 16 However,
the actual amount of the award must be determined by using
only the enumerated statutory factors, and not other factors
such as fault."
It seems strange that Virginia could bar considerations of all
but economic fault in property distribution,"' yet allow adultery to act as a complete bar to spousal support. We have already seen that property division does not make the parties
whole--only spousal support has the potential to do this."
Although there should be consequences for marital fault, it
should not be a complete bar to spousal support since equitable
property division will not be likely to leave the guilty spouse
with enough upon which to live. With these factors in mind,

214. Id.; see also Hall v. Hall, 388 S.E.2d 669, 669 n.1 (Va. Ct. App. 1990). In
Hall v. Hall, the Virginia Court of Appeals points out that
[in 1988 the General Assembly amended Code § 20-107.1 to remove
desertion and several other fault grounds for divorce as bars to the
award of permanent maintenance and support. Presently, the only fault
grounds which may bar permanent maintenance and support are provided
for in Code § 20-91(1), which are adultery, sodomy or buggery committed
outside the marriage.
Id.
215. Barnes v. Barnes, 428 S.E.2d 294, 298 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
216. Id.
217. Id.; Steinberg v. Steinberg, 398 S.E.2d 507, 510 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
218. Gamer v. Gamer, 429 S.E.2d 618, 622-23 (Va. Ct. App. 1993); Marion v.
Marion, 401 S.E.2d 432, 436 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). In Aster v. Gross, the Virginia court
of Appeals said:
Circumstances that lead to the dissolution of the marriage but have no
effect upon marital property, its value, or otherwise are not relevant to
determining a monetary award, need not be considered. ... When there
is no suggestion that the additional acts of misconduct added to the
economic consequences caused by the dissolution of the marriage, the evidence is irrelevant to the determination of a monetary award.
Aster v. Gross, 371 S.E.2d 833, 836-37 (Va. Ct. App. 1988)
219. See supra Part III.B.
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some modification to Virginia's spousal support statute is in

order.
When a spouse is blameless for the marital breach, Virginia
courts hold that the breaching party must maintain the "blameless" (or "innocent") spouse according to the standard to which
he or she was accustomed during marriage."' The court must
also review all the statutory factors enumerated above, 2 ' and
the amount awarded must be fair and just.2"
An alimony scheme which takes fault into account could be
fashioned from Virginia's existing statutes with minimal refinements. Equitable awards could be fashioned by increasing the
wide latitude of judicial discretion already present in the existing framework. Rather than being a complete bar to support,
fault should instead become one of the enumerated factors for
judicial consideration, thus acting to increase or reduce the
award to the lower-earning spouse. That part of section 20107.1 which bars support would be deleted from the statute,
and the court would consider, when determining whether to
award alimony and the amount of such an award, the existing
enumerated factors plus the additional factor described below
("the Proposal"). This would have the effect of providing lowerearning spouses with more than solely property division when
fault exists.
The Proposal would require an expectation result if the higher wage-earner has engaged in marital conduct involving fault.

220. Gamble v. Gamble, 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (Va. Ct. App. 1992). In Via v. Via,
the Virginia Court of Appeals said:
In a divorce case, where a claim for alimony is made by a wife who has
been held blameless for the marital breach, the law imposes upon the
husband the duty, within the limits of his financial ability, to maintain
his former wife according to the station in life to which she was accustomed during the marriage.
In fixing the amount of alimony, the court must look to the financial needs of the wife, her age, physical condition and her ability to earn,
and balance against these circumstances the financial ability of the husband to pay, considering his income and ability to earn. The amount
awarded must, in any event, be fair and just under all the circumstances
of the case.
Via v. Via, 419 S.E.2d 431, 433 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Klotz v. Klotz, 127
S.E.2d 104, 106 (Va. 1962)).
221. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
222. Gamble, 421 S.E.2d at 644.
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As has been suggested by other authors, such a provision would
require the breaching party to share one-half of his or her income with the non-breaching party (provided that the breaching
party is the higher wage-earner).2" On the other hand, if
fault is committed by the lower wage-earner, then the court
would decrease an "Ellman" award (described in the next paragraph) by a certain factor which would be determined at the
judge's discretion, while taking into account all the statutory

factors.
If there is no fault, the statutory measure of spousal support
would be along the terms advocated by Professor Ellman, along
with the other statutory factors. This would have the effect of
attempting to include some of the "non-quantifiable" contributions described by Professor Carbone in considering Virginia's
sixth statutory factor, which calls for a consideration of nonmonetary contributions to the family's well-being. 2"
There would be a catch-all provision which would provide a
floor below which spousal support could not fall, unless the
payor spouse could not feasibly pay any support.Y

223. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 2, at 1117-18; see supra text accompanying note
145.
224. Virginia courts have shown they are quite capable of factoring "nonquantifiable" factors into post-divorce financial determinations. See, e.g., Srinivasan v.
Srinivasan, 396 S.E.2d 675, 678 (Va.Ct. App. 1990). In holding that the trial court
did not err in its equitable property division, the Srinivasan court stated:
Because of the unique circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of
discretion in shaping this division of the marital property. The husband
worked under a hardship throughout the marriage, most of the time
holding two jobs, and sacrificing his own lifestyle and career opportunity
so that the wife could pursue her career and education. The husband
was deprived not only of the physical comforts of life but also of the
company of his family. The wife, who was able during much of the marriage to contribute to the financial support of the family, continued to
receive education more for self-fulfillment than for the future financial
support of the family.
Id.
225. The numbers used in the proposed statute are completely arbitrary and
merely chosen for illustrative purposes. An empirical study of wages and standards of
living in particular areas would be required to set levels of support. The idea is to
mandate a basic need level below which we do not want the support to fall even if
there is fault involved. This sort of number-crunching is best determined by the legislature. There would obviously be a need to determine different levels for different
localities-a state-wide amount would be useless due to varying demographics.
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Finally, the spousal support should not be permanent, except
in cases where the divorce occurs after a long-term marriage
and it would be inequitable to require the lower-earning spouse
to attempt to secure work. The reason for not making support
permanent is that we do not wish to provide incentives for
continued dependence in cases where the marriage is of short
duration with a concomitant lesser investment. The proposed
limit of five years would allow enough time for re-education and
acquisition of employment. The court could modify this time
limit, but would have to certify in its order that there were
certain equitable reasons for the modification, e.g., the spouse
already had a lucrative career, or has a Ph.D. and needs less
time to find a job. Moreover, if the spouse does not pursue
education or training opportunities and refuses to find a job,
the award could be curtailed. 6 Looking at the equities of a
particular situation, the court might decide to lengthen the
duration of spousal support under the right circumstances. For
example, if the marriage had lasted fifteen years, the children
were in sixth or seventh grade, the wife had been away from
the work force for about ten years, a court might decree that it
would be equitable to maintain the award long enough for the
children to graduate from high school.22

226. But see Dixon v. Pugh, 423 S.E.2d 169, 170 (Va. 1992) ("[A] court may not
modify an award of spousal support in a divorce decree in the absence of a statute or
a clear and explicit reservation of jurisdiction to modify the spousal support provi-

sion.").
227. Virginia courts already have the discretion to "impute" income to a spouse
who is seeking spousal support and has not found a job though qualified for employ-

ment. See, e.g., Srinivasan, 396 S.E.2d at 679.
In refusing to make a spousal support award in favor the wife, the court
imputed to her an income of $33,000 based upon what the court found
she could be earning if she would work as a research grant analyst or
teach, as she was qualified to do [since she had a Ph.D. and had taught
at George Mason University]. The court noted that she is an expert in
oriental studies, concentrating in Indian art and religion, with a knowledge of the Sanskrit language. A court may under appropriate circumstances impute income to a party seeking spousal support. This conclusion logically flows from the principle that one who seeks spousal support
is obligated to earn as much as he or she reasonably can to reduce the

amount of the support need.

648

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:605

Below is the Proposal's language, which could be inserted at
the end of section 20-107.1 of the Virginia Code in order to
accomplish the above goals:
10. a) If any grounds of divorce under the provisions of §
20-91(1), (3), (6), or § 20-95 exist in favor of the lower
wage-earner, then the higher wage-earner shall make payments in the amount of one-half of his earnings during the
duration of the award.
b) If any grounds of divorce under the provisions of § 2091(1), (3), (6), or § 20-95 exist in favor of the higher wageearner, then the lower wage-earner shall receive a reduced
award, in the court's discretion and in light of the other
factors listed in this section, from the amount he or she
would have obtained under subsection 10.c).
c) If no grounds of divorce under the provisions of § 2091(1), (3), (6), or § 20-95 exist in favor of either spouse,
then the court shall fashion a spousal support award in
favor of the lower-earning spouse in the amount of any
marital investment resulting in a post-marriage reduction in
that spouse's earning capacity, taking into account all the
other factors listed in this section.
d) The spousal support award may not fall below the
following levels, unless the higher-earning spouse is unable
to meet such payments: 1) where the payor spouse's annual
income equals or exceeds $60,000 the award shall not fall
below $20,000 per annum; 2) where the payor spouse's
annual income is less than $60,000 the award shall be no
less than one-third of the payor spouse's income.
e) The duration of the award shall be five years unless
the court determines that the interests of justice would be
better served by a different period of time. The trial court
preserves the right to modify the spousal support provisions
at any time during the duration of the support period and
up to one year following its termination, notwithstanding
the provisions of Rule 1:1 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia.
This proposed scheme is not perfect by any means, but it provides a framework for discussion about using fault constructively in alimony determinations. It should be capable of refinement so as to meet most criticisms which will no doubt be
levelled at it. Following are two situations posited by Professor
Ellman where the modified Virginia proposal works better than
his theory.
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B. Putting the Proposal into Practice
Situation 1:
The wife ... supports her husband through medical school,
abandoning her own professional training while working in
a job she does not particularly like. Perhaps she bears a
child as well, the birth well timed to coincide with her
husband's completion of his training. But at that point he
announces his intention to leave her for another woman he
2
has taken a fancy to."

Situation 2:
[Tihe same marriage ends, at the same time, but now because the wife announces her long-standing passion for a
poet she met when her husband was studying late in the
library at the beginning of his training. Perhaps the child
of the marriage is really the poet's. The poet cannot support
her or her child very well, but the wife believes she can
solve that problem by the share she expects to receive in
her husband's future income as a physician. 9
Professor Ellman recognizes that there is no way to distinguish these two situations unless the system of alimony incorporates findings of fault in fashioning an award. 3 ° In light of
Professor Ellman's own goals of fashioning disincentives to help
discourage marriage-destroying behavior, the Virginia Proposal
outlined above would provide equitable results in both situations. The Proposal would also have the advantage of conforming to existing societal moral values in marriage as memorialized in the statutory fault grounds. Additionally, the Proposal
would provide some consequences for marriage-destroying behavior in all cases.
In Situation 1, the Proposal would award the wife not only
her lost earning capacity, but an equal share in her husband's
earnings for a period of five years. This is the classic expecta-

228. Ellman, supra note 183, at 303-04.

229. Id. at 304.
230. Id.
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tion measure of damages mentioned by Professor Carbone.2'
This would allow the wife who was blameless in the breach of
the marital contract embodied by her husband's desertion to
recoup from her husband some of the expectations she had
upon giving up her career in order to enable him to begin his.
Five years should be long enough for her to regain to some
extent her forsaken career opportunities.
In Situation 2, the court would decrease the wife's award due
to her adultery. The amount of the reduction would be left to
the court, as would be the computation of her lost earning
capacity. Assuming she was a college graduate with an aerospace engineering degree, the court could fashion an award by
looking at average salaries for such professionals in the area
and decrease the award based on the fault and other factors
from that salary. The result would be less than she would have
obtained in a divorce not involving fault, but should not fall
below a certain level. In this situation the Proposal also provides consequences for marriage-destroying behavior.
Thus it appears that the Proposal is generally workable. It
provides disincentives for marital behavior deemed morally
flawed by society while providing a floor level to ensure that
spouses are not left without means of re-entering the work
force. There is no reason for a spouse to have to resort to welfare simply because she went through a divorce and there was
insufficient marital property to provide her with the means of
retraining herself for work and a career.
There may be certain situations for which the Proposal would
not yield results which are quite as clear-cut and morally satisfactory, but the courts are adept at fashioning appropriate remedies when given the discretion to do so. 232 The Proposal embodies great discretion for the court, and that is by design.

231. See Carbone, supra note 135, at 1472.
232. See Schneider, supra note 154, at 243-54.

1996]

FAULT IN MARITAL RELATIONS

V.

CONCLUSION

This article has argued for a change in the way financial
considerations are handled at divorce. Alimony is currently, and
perhaps it always has been, underused as a tool to implement
the socially desirable goal of marriage as a sharing enterprise.
This article has discussed the need for greater use of alimony
upon divorce, analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of Professor Ellman's proposed theory of alimony, and suggested how the
injection of fault provides the courts with a more amenable tool
to effect the goal of stable marital relationships.
What is needed currently is more responsible relations between adults. No-fault divorce did not begin the process of
marital breakdown, but it has certainly failed to provide any
incentive whatsoever to avoid it. Perhaps a new look at fault
and a new role for it in the current system of available no-fault
divorce along the lines of the Proposal delineated in Part V
might aid society in at least re-injecting accountability for actions between spouses. This article invites criticism and response, and it is hoped that it sparks some renewed interest in
the use of fault in fashioning spousal support awards.

Adriaen M. Morse Jr.

